



## Why IDPs Matter in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

**Seepan V. Parseghian**

Nestled in the heart of the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh has been the site of ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azeris from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and more recently, from 1988-1994. Although a self-enforcing cease-fire has been in place since then, a stalled and shaky peace process has failed to bring the conflicting parties to agreement, allowing Karabakh to develop as an unrecognized state.<sup>1</sup> Scholars and experts of ethnic conflict who have studied the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have often placed it in the context of the collapse of the USSR, the phenomenon of unrecognized states, or the development of the South Caucasus. Because of these approaches, the variety of solutions and compromises that scholars design have all missed a crucial component of any successful peace agreement among Armenia, Karabakh, and Azerbaijan – the domestic populace, and more specifically, internally displaced peoples (IDPs).

In this paper, I will argue that the governing regimes in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the OSCE Minsk Group,<sup>2</sup> have largely ignored any serious attempts to integrate IDPs into the negotiation framework of the Karabakh peace process. Although current frameworks by the Minsk Group include provisions that allow for IDP repatriation and compensation,<sup>3</sup> measures fostering economic development in refugee camps, community dialogue with a now-distant foe, and reconciliation are absent. Without a sympathetic understanding of IDPs' historical wants and current needs, and a cautious attitude towards the threat IDPs may pose to the peace process, the negotiating parties will find their efforts jeopardized having shunned an integral factor of any possible peace plan.

This paper will first introduce the concept of IDPs, the problems IDPs face in the international community today, and the threat they can potentially pose to peace agreements. The paper will then explain the historical context in which the Karabakh conflict began, and will dispel scholars' present notions that a peaceful cohabitation between Armenians and Azeris in Karabakh existed prior to the collapse of the USSR. In the third section, the paper will describe the situation under which the massive IDP populations arose as a result of the Karabakh war, these populations' deteriorating living standards since the cease-fire, and the imminent threat they now pose to the Karabakh peace process. Finally, the paper will conclude with a policy proposal to the Minsk Group that targets the IDPs within the current negotiation framework.

### **A Brief History of Internally Displaced Peoples**

Often confused with refugees, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) have yet to receive the attention and support of individual states and the international community essential for their survival. Whereas refugees can claim immediate international assistance having crossed state borders, IDPs depend mainly on their governments, who are often unable or unwilling to care for them. As a result, the global IDP total has surged from 15 million in 1989 to 25 million spread across 49 countries today.<sup>4</sup> In comparison, the number of refugees in the same period has decreased from 15 to 12 million.<sup>5</sup> 18 million IDPs in 30 countries do not have adequate government support for basic living needs, and one in two IDPs in the world is subject to regime hostility. In addition, 14 million IDPs live in constant risk of death through violence.<sup>6</sup>

Compounding the hostility IDPs face from their own states, the international community has responded to the IDP crisis in a manner characterized as paltry at best. UN agencies last year failed to target 25% of IDPs, and only indirectly aided 50%.<sup>7</sup> G8 states, which have provided up to half of the annual budget of IDP-inflicted countries, virtually ignore the IDP problem when allocating foreign aid. Only in 2004 did a single donor organization, the USAID, formally issue a policy recognizing IDPs as a unique group in need of foreign assistance.<sup>8</sup>

Alongside its moral imperative to aid IDPs, the global community

has also failed to address the threat IDPs pose to conflict resolution. Often the product of ethnic conflict, the 70-80% of IDPs that are women and children constantly face poverty, infrastructure damage, and other barriers to opportunities for education and a hopeful future<sup>9</sup>. IDPs residing in the former Soviet states like Azerbaijan face a unique barrier because of the *propiska* residential certificate system that lingered after the collapse of the USSR. Under the system, a citizen could only attend school in the area indicated in the resident certificate. Because either most IDPs have lost their certificates or fled to an area different from the one designated on their certificate, they are unable to attend school and access employment opportunities.<sup>10</sup> Breeding ethnic hatred and joining in illicit activity, they form a domestic obstacle to peace and stability. The states that can attest to this reality had poorly executed plans that addressed IDPs, and were ill prepared to contain explosive reactions from IDP communities towards fragile peace agreements effectively.<sup>11</sup> In the Karabakh negotiations between Armenian and Azerbaijan, the warring parties have also overlooked IDPs as an obstacle to peace, treating them as a humanitarian, rather than a security, problem.

### **A History of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict from a Domestic Perspective**

A look at the history of Armenians and Azeris in Karabakh is useful in understanding why the IDPs pose a security threat to a possible peace agreement, and may provide fuel to the dying fire of the Karabakh conflict. I begin my analysis of both peoples' historical narratives relating to Karabakh with the period between the mid-19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, in which modern notions of nationalism initially arose in the Caucasus.<sup>12</sup> This starting point is gravely important in itself, since Armenians repeatedly allude to their historical claim of Karabakh that dates back to Armenian Orthodox churches built in the 4<sup>th</sup> century and to a unique "Artsakh" civilization founded much earlier. On the other hand, Azeris claim to be direct descendants of the Caucasian Albanians, who also inhabited Karabakh but later disappeared. Whether or not a primordialist argument exists in the Karabakh conflict, these ancient historical claims demonstrate the extent to which both groups have constructed nations that incorporate Karabakh.

More specifically, the city of Shushi represents to both peoples a center of intellectual and cultural renaissance. For Armenians, when the Persian and Ottoman empires occupied the rest of the Armenian nation, Karabakh and Shushi in particular endured as an intellectual center and bastion of freedom. For example, Mesrop Mashdots, who created the Armenian alphabet in the 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> century, conducted much of his work in Shushi and the nearby Amaras monastery. Similarly, Azeris revere Shushi for being the birthplace of many of their 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century intellectual leaders and cultural traditions. For instance, the Shushi mosque that still stands today hosted many Azeri national plays and religious ceremonies. Moreover, legendary cultural figure Natevan grew up and performed her ballads in Shushi. Thus as philosopher Avishai Margalit would posit, both Armenians and Azeris have marked Shushi as a “holy” component of their national identity, just as both Jews and Palestinians have declared Jerusalem holy to their respective identities.<sup>13</sup> As Thomas de Waal accurately notes, “Shusha has been called the 'Jerusalem of Karabakh.’”<sup>14</sup> As Margalit explains, because holy sites are inherently non-negotiable, they can often lead to conflict by the parties that declare them exclusively holy.

Yet as de Waal, and David Laitin and Ronald Suny have emphasized, Armenians and Azeris peacefully coexisted in Karabakh during 70 years of Soviet rule, and had even become model Soviet citizens void of any strong nationalist sentiments. De Waal alludes to the many personal accounts of intermarriages and friendships members of both ethnic groups had cultivated with one another that persisted as memories or sentimental tokens after the end of the Karabakh war. Laitin and Suny use demographic data to demonstrate that Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Shushi were all highly heterogeneously populated cities with vibrant intercultural dynamics among Armenians, Azeris, Kurds, and Georgians.<sup>15</sup> From these descriptions and accounts, the authors derive their notions of Karabakh as a region that experienced stable peace between two neighboring ethnic groups. More importantly, scholars have largely overlooked the Armenian and Azeri masses as contributing factors to the conflict and its future peaceful resolution, since they have proven their ability to coexist peacefully.

However, a few significant episodes prior to the 1980s that de Waal and other scholars overlook, support an alternative view that interprets the seemingly stable peace under Soviet rule actually to be the façade of a

“pressure cooker” for the eventual conflict, rather than simple proof of harmonious coexistence. This view also holds that the friendships and vibrant intercultural exchanges between Armenians and Azeris were more an inevitable consequence of Soviet totalitarian rule than an example of true longstanding, peaceful coexistence. The first indication of conflict between Armenians and Azeris occurred in 1918-1920, when Armenia and Azerbaijan each declared independence and claimed Nagorno-Karabakh as part of their fledgling states. With the retreat of British troops that had replaced Turkish troops in Azerbaijan after World War I, a bloody war ensued between the Armenians of Karabakh and the Azeri military. The short war ended after Armenian troops intervened on behalf of the Karabakhi Armenians, but anti-Armenian pogroms during the war resulted in more than 20,000 Armenian deaths and the destruction of Shushi, and led the League of Nations to exclude the Azerbaijani Republic from membership for violating human rights and making territorial claims.<sup>16</sup> After the Soviet Union incorporated the three Transcaucasian republics and granted Karabakh the status of an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan SSR, the conflict subsided due to effective Soviet rule.

Even in the USSR though, Armenian-Azeri tensions in Karabakh existed and more surprisingly, Soviet policy exacerbated them. During the Stalin era and before World War II for example, Karabakhi Armenians were increasingly convinced of an organized Azerbaijani policy to dilute Karabakh of Armenians. Regional Azeri leaders rerouted main roads that linked major Karabakhi cities to go first through a majority Azeri city such as Aghdam or Fizuli.<sup>17</sup> In the 1930s, Azerbaijani authorities shut down 118 Armenian churches, made Azeri the official language of majority-Armenian Karabakh, and forbid Armenian language class in schools.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps if de Waal had considered this harsh language policy, he would not have been so surprised when he recounts the story of an old Karabakhi Armenian man proposing a toast: “He began—for my benefit—in Russian, swerved into the thick Karabakh Armenian dialect, and then into a smoother gliding language that I realized with a shock was Azeri.”<sup>19</sup> Whether or not Azerbaijan SSR systematically carried out a systematic policy did not matter to the Armenians, for they only had to remember Nakhichevan, another ethnically mixed region south of Armenia SSR where the Armenian majority had disappeared under Soviet Azeri rule.<sup>20</sup>

Not only did indications of ethnic tensions exist in Soviet Karabakh, but forecasts of the 1988 mass demonstrations surfaced as well. In 1945, 1965, 1967, and 1977, Karabakh Armenian representatives expressed community grievances and demands for greater autonomy to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Particularly in 1965, more than two decades before the right to petition became available under *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Karabakh Armenian representatives collected 45,000 signatures for a petition requesting greater autonomy and access to Armenia SSR.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, in Yerevan in 1966, authorities jailed a group of Armenian intellectuals among whom were future president Levon Ter-Petrossian and prime minister Vazgen Manukian, for leading tens of thousands of students in a protest demanding for Karabakhis greater rights and stronger connections with Armenia SSR.<sup>22</sup>

These incidents demonstrate that ethnic tensions did indeed exist in Soviet Karabakh between Armenians and Azeris in the form of Azeri oppression of the majority Armenian populace. Dispelling the notion of a stable and peaceful coexistence, these accounts testify in favor of the “pressure cooker” view, that intercultural exchange was the forced medium of daily life, and that the mass demonstrations in 1988 were merely the logical next step, rather than an unexpected one, in a process of rising ethnic tensions over the “holy” region of Karabakh.

### **The Tragic Creation of IDPs and Their Peacetime Situation**

I have thus far shown that policymakers, scholars, and the Minsk Group negotiators must include the dynamic and growing Armenian-Azeri ethnic tensions of the Soviet period in their analysis of the possibilities for peace in Karabakh. This brief historical account clearly demonstrates that both ethnic groups do not have precedent of peaceful coexistence on which to rely, and thus any future coexistence with the aim of peace will be a venture into uncharted territory. To complement these considerations, scholars and policymakers must direct more attention to the destitute IDP populations, who are not only an integral piece of any peaceful resolution, but have also become an increasingly destabilizing agent in the negotiation process.

Beginning in 1988 with the Armenian pogroms in Sumgait, Azerbaijan, the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Azerbaijan and Azeris from

Armenia created a mass refugee flow that immediately destabilized the South Caucasus. By August 1989, almost 350,000 Armenians living in Baku, Sumgait, and Gyanja claimed refugee status in Armenia or Russia, while in 1988-1991, all 85,000 Azerbaijanis living in Armenia had fled to Baku.<sup>23</sup> Yet, the most severe episodes of ethnic cleansing occurred during the Karabakh war of 1992-1994, which further polarized the two ethnic groups on a physical and ideological level to form a schism the most capable Mandela could not mend. In the opening stages of the war, both Armenian and Azeri forces perceived the quantity and strategic location of deportations to be effective signals to the enemy of its destructive capability. In the village of Lesnoy, all Azeri civilians peacefully surrendered to Armenian forces, but the troops had entered the village solely to deport the Azeri population as an intimidation tactic.<sup>24</sup> Only after the deportations in Lesnoy and later in Khojali did Azeri forces understand the enemy they were battling. Similarly, in Northern Karabakh Azeri forces conducted "Operation Ring," in which the troops cleansed wholly Armenian villages of its inhabitants with what de Waal labels "a strategic motive" to suppress the Karabakh movement in Stepanakert.<sup>25</sup> By the end of the war, these atrocities had created 575,000 Azerbaijani IDPs, who primarily fled the seven territories surrounding Karabakh that Armenian forces currently occupy, and about 4,000 Armenian IDPs, most of whom lived in the Northern Karabakh towns of Getashen, Shahumian, and Martounashen that Azeri forces occupy today.<sup>26</sup> Azerbaijan has since had one of the largest humanitarian crises per capita in the world, while in Armenia the government has granted citizenship to all IDPs and has integrated them into the local population.

After Russia brokered the May 1994 cease-fire that Armenian, Karabakhi, and Azeri delegates signed, the IDPs immediately lost their humanitarian value in the eyes of state negotiators, instead becoming bargaining chips at the Minsk Group roundtable. Waiting to repatriate the IDPs to the occupied territories, the Azeri regime has watched as the fraction of IDPs unable to meet their subsistence needs increased from 74% to 90% from 1998-2001.<sup>27</sup> The Azeri government has repeatedly refused UN proposals to provide the IDPs development aid in addition to humanitarian aid, because as de Waal learns, "The implication is that would mean losing them as refugees and objects of pity: they may be more useful to the government as a symbol of Azerbaijan's suffering than as people with real problems."<sup>28</sup>

As a result, over half of the Azeri IDP population still lives in temporary shelters, and of the 200,000 IDP children, 22% do not attend school, 95% cannot afford school materials, and none have exposure to peace education programs.<sup>29</sup> Under these dire conditions, the IDPs have transformed as a collective unit into a grave threat to peacefully resolving the Karabakh conflict and to domestic stability in Azerbaijan.

The instability stems from the fact that while 70% of IDP adults have a secondary school education, two-thirds are unemployed.<sup>30</sup> Conditioned to anti-Armenian political rhetoric by campaigning politicians, and segregated from local communities, these IDPs can potentially turn frustration into violence.<sup>31</sup> The 2004 murder of an Armenian NATO officer by his Azeri counterpart – an IDP from the Jebrazil region – warns of the possible future.<sup>32</sup> More alarmingly, the “Saniya” Humanitarian Information Analytical Agency of Azerbaijan found in a statistical survey it conducted in 2004, that 72.4% of IDPs expect that full-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia will resume for the conflict to end. Almost inversely, 75.3% of Armenian refugees believe that the conflict will end through peaceful means alone. Equally strikingly, 73.4% of Azeri IDPs responded that they are personally ready to take part in military actions and send relatives to the frontline, whereas only 8.8% of the Azeri citizenry at large would take such measures.<sup>33</sup> This data establishes a strong correlation between the dire conditions of IDPs and their propensity to view the Karabakh conflict through a non-peaceful mindset. Without increased attention from the Azeri state, NGOs, and the OSCE Minsk Group geared towards community integration and peace initiatives, these IDPs will assuredly become a grave source of instability during eventual implementation of a peace agreement.

More importantly for the OSCE Minsk Group and the Armenian and Azeri parties to the negotiation, the IDP issue needs to have more than just bargaining chip value. To ensure stable implementation of a future peace agreement, the OSCE must take active and creative steps that establish IDP peace initiatives as essential pieces of the Karabakh negotiation framework currently under discussion. Especially under the current framework, which sees Azerbaijan conceding Lachin *and* Kelbajar to Armenia in addition to a Karabakhi referendum on status,<sup>34</sup> the Minsk Group can be sure that the IDP reaction will produce harsh consequences.

### Possible Solutions to the IDP Issue in the Karabakh Negotiations

In the ideal scenario de Waal envisions, a realistic peace in Karabakh would resemble the Sadakhlo market on the Georgia-Armenia border. In this bustling market of produce and retail goods, Armenians and Azeris productively and peacefully work together as sellers and buyers, merchants, and friends. Although I also hope for the vision that de Waal sets forth, it is a useless one to consider for the foreseeable future. Before economic prosperity can lead to a novel peaceful coexistence between Armenians and Azeris, the domestic populace and the IDPs in particular radically need to transform their outlook of the Karabakh conflict to be facilitators of peace, rather than obstacles. The solution I outline below utilizes the occupied territories and oil revenues, which are the strengths of Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively in the negotiations, to generate a plan for integrating IDPs into the negotiations and peace implementation processes.

From 2006-2024, the Azeri regime expects to collect \$143 billion of oil revenue into the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), allocating just \$109 million for IDPs.<sup>35</sup> In perspective, the regime has increased military spending to match the entire Armenian budget of \$1 billion by 2008, inciting a tacit arms race with Armenia.<sup>36</sup> On the Armenian side, the seven territories of Lachin, Kelbajar, Aghdam, Fizuli, Jibrail, Qubaty, and Zangelan that it occupies are its main strength simply because the territories are what Azerbaijan most desires. However, especially in the Lachin and Kelbajar regions, Armenian refugees and IDPs have begun a resettlement process. In addition to renaming Lachin and Kelbajar to their historic Armenian names of Kashatagh and Karvajar respectively, the regions have settlement populations numbering in the thousands, with schools and administrative structures. Most importantly, various Armenian Diaspora organizations are actively fundraising to support financially these settlement plans without the active involvement of either the Armenian or Karabakhi governments.<sup>37</sup> Left in the current interstate stalemate, the Azeri oil and Armenian occupied territories are likely to lose their bargaining potential to contribute to a peace plan as Azeri defense spending and Armenian resettlement continues.

I propose that the OSCE Minsk Group include a SOFAZ-IDP program in the negotiation framework between Armenia and Azerbaijan. First,

the Azeri negotiating party (AzNP) will use SOFAZ to fund an IDP policy in accordance with UNHCR plans to reduce poverty with income-generating schemes and micro-credit loans for the unemployed and enroll all IDP children in school with emphasis on peace education programs. Humanitarian aid will finance new IDP settlements and subsistence needs. An independent commission comprised of OSCE, UNHCR, and Norwegian Refugee Council representatives will assess the progress of SOFAZ-IDP every two years, and will report its results to the Armenian negotiating party (ANP) and AzNP. If the commission concludes that the policy was a success, then the ANP must agree to transfer at least one of the seven occupied territories to Azeri authority. The Azeri leadership will then present IDPs the option of repatriation funded by SOFAZ-IDP, but cannot force them to return. Armenia will return the occupied territories to Azerbaijan if it receives Karabakhi security guarantees. Indeed, Azeri forces had bombed Stepanakert from two of the occupied territories: Lachin and Aghdam.<sup>38</sup> Only an international peacekeeping force will provide these security measures, but both states can halt rising instability by maintaining military budgets lower than the annual allocation of SOFAZ-IDP aid. Although the SOFAZ-IDP program does not resolve all negotiation issues, it ensures a promising future for the IDPs and a gradual transfer of authority over the occupied territories.

The Azeri government may argue that it has already implemented an IDP integration program using oil funds. However, 90% of IDPs assert that these programs do not meet their minimal needs.<sup>39</sup> The leadership has also exploited the lack of oversight in SOFAZ to divert profits from IDP aid to budget expenses. However, under SOFAZ-IDP, this oversight exists, and the regime has incentives of regaining land and using oil profits elsewhere. Opponents of SOFAZ-IDP can point to the failures of IDP peace initiatives in the Philippines and Afghanistan to forecast the outcome of this program. In those cases, lack of IDP participation in the peace process led to failure when implementation began.<sup>40</sup> Although Azeri IDPs do not have a voice in the overall negotiation process, the independent commission ensures that IDPs contribute to the formulation of policy with Azeri authorities.

Although this proposed plan is merely an initial attempt at solving the critical IDP issue in the negotiations and may not be entirely practical in the policy world, it demonstrates that creative efforts, combined with polit-

ical will and the aim of someday realizing the Sadakhlo vision, hold the key to peace. For now however, Karabakh remains the holy soil claimed by two ethnic enemies, of whom IDPs retain the most hatred.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For more on unrecognized states in the former USSR, see: King, Charles. "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics*, Vol. 53, July 2001, pgs. 524–52.

<sup>2</sup> In 1992-93, the then CSCE (now OSCE), created the Minsk Group that developed into the main mediating body in the Karabakh conflict. Today, it is co-chaired by the US, France, and Russia.

<sup>3</sup> Personal interview with senior Armenian Foreign Ministry official, Yerevan, August 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Norwegian Refugee Council. "Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2004," Geneva, March 2005, pg. 9-10.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 6.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations High Commission for Refugees. "2004 Global Refugee Trends," <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocpdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=40d015fb4>

<sup>8</sup> US Association of International Development. "Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy, October 2004," <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbd.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Mooney, Erin and French, Colleen. "Barriers and Bridges: Access to Education for Internally Displaced Peoples," Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 3.

<sup>11</sup> For an in-depth analysis of the effects of refugees and IDPs on peace agreement processes, refer to: Gil Loescher and James Milner, *Protracted Refugee Situations*. Adelphi Paper 375, IISS, London, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Laitin, David and Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Thinking a Way out of Karabakh," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VII, No. 1, October 1999, pgs. 146-149.

<sup>13</sup> Margalit, Avishai. "Indecent Compromise," Tanner Lecture at Stanford Law School, January 2005, pg. 4.

<sup>14</sup> De Waal, Thomas. *Black Garden*, New York: New York University Press, 2004, pg. 185.

<sup>15</sup> Laitin and Suny, pg. 146.

<sup>16</sup> Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Representation in the US. "Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1920," [http://www.nkrusa.org/nk\\_conflict/nk\\_1918\\_1920.shtml](http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/nk_1918_1920.shtml).

<sup>17</sup> Personal interview with former senior Karabakh Armenian negotiator to the USSR, Stepanakert, July 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Papazian, Lalg. "A People's Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabagh." *The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh*. Ed. Levon Chorbajian. New York: Palgrave Publishers. 2001,

pg. 64.

<sup>19</sup> De Waal, pg. 188.

<sup>20</sup> Even today, Azeris in Nakhichevan continue to rid the region of Armenian culture. Now that no Armenians live there, Azeri soldiers have been caught desecrating Armenian cemeteries and churches with the compliance of the regional government. UNESCO and the US State Department have called this a tragedy requiring action. Refer to: <http://www.armenianow.com/?action=viewArticle&AID=1301&IID=1064&lng=eng>

<sup>21</sup> NKR Rep. "Struggle for Freedom, 1923-1988," [http://www.nkrusa.org/nk\\_conflict/struggle\\_for\\_freedom.shtml](http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/struggle_for_freedom.shtml).

<sup>22</sup> Libaridian, Gerard. *The Challenge of Statehood*, Cambridge, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1999, pg. 111-12.

<sup>23</sup> Kharatyan, Hranush. "Solution of the Karabakh Problem from the View of Armenian Refugees," ed. Gayane Novikova, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: In Search of a Way Out*, Yerevan: Center for Strategic Analysis, pg. 54.

<sup>24</sup> Personal interview with former general of the Karabakh Defense Forces, Stepanakert, July 2005.

<sup>25</sup> De Waal, pg. 121.

<sup>26</sup> "Profile of Internal Displacement: Azerbaijan." Norwegian Refugee Council, February 2005, pg. 25.

<sup>27</sup> "Household Food Economy Survey among the Internally Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan." World Food Programme, 30 November 2001, (Baku, Azerbaijan).

<sup>28</sup> De Waal, pg. 221.

<sup>29</sup> Norwegian Refugee Council, pg. 54.

<sup>30</sup> "Profiles in Displacement: Azerbaijan. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng." United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 25 January 1999, para. 31.

<sup>31</sup> Norwegian Refugee Council, pg. 95.

<sup>32</sup> Alexanyan, Zhanna. "A Savage Killing: Murder of NATO Officer at Peace Program Provokes Outrage," 27 February 2004, <http://www.armenianow.com/archive/2004/2004/february27/news/hungary/index.asp.htm>

<sup>33</sup> Novikova, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: in Search of a Way Out*, Annex 2, pgs. 152-205.

<sup>34</sup> Personal interview with senior Armenian Foreign Ministry official, Yerevan, August 2005.

<sup>35</sup> "USACC Hosts Executive Director of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan." United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, 4 November 2005, <http://www.usacc.org/news.php?nid=632>.

<sup>36</sup> Ziyadov, Taleh and Alman, Mir-Ismael. "Arms Race in the South Caucasus: a Time Bomb?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*: Jamestown Foundation, 25 July 2005, [http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2370058](http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370058).

<sup>37</sup> Personal interview with Senior Director of the Karabakh National Security Council for

the Disputed Territories, Stepanakert, July 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Aivazian, Armen. "Possible Solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh Problem: a Strategic Perspective," in Chorbajian, *The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh*, pgs. 220-21.

<sup>39</sup> Tsalik, Svetlana. "Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?" *Caspian Revenue Watch*, 2003, pg. 97.

<sup>40</sup> "Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2004." Norwegian Refugee Council Global IDP Project, March 2005, pg. 31-33.

## Works Cited

Aivazian, Armen. "Possible Solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh Problem: a Strategic Perspective," in Chorbajian, *The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh*

Alexanyan, Zhanna. "A Savage Killing: Murder of NATO Officer at Peace Program Provokes Outrage," 27 February 2004

De Waal, Thomas. *Black Garden*, New York: New York University Press, 2004

"Household Food Economy Survey among the Internally Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan." World Food Programme, 30 November 2001, (Baku, Azerbaijan)

Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2004." Norwegian Refugee Council Global IDP Project, March 2005

Kharatyan, Hranush. "Solution of the Karabakh Problem from the View of Armenian Refugees," ed. Gayane Novikova, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: in Search of a Way Out*, Yerevan: Center for Strategic Analysis

King, Charles. "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics*, Vol. 53, July 2001

Laitin, David and Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Thinking a Way out of Karabakh," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VII, No. 1, October 1999

Libaridian, Gerard. *The Challenge of Statehood*, Cambridge, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1999

Loescher, Gil and Milner, James. *Protracted Refugee Situations*. Adelphi Paper 375, IISS, London, 2005.

Margalit, Avishai. "Indecent Compromise," Tanner Lecture at Stanford Law School, January 2005,

Mooney, Erin and French, Colleen. "Barriers and Bridges: Access to Education for Internally Displaced Peoples," Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 2005.

- Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Representation in the US. "Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-1920," [http://www.nkrusa.org/nk\\_conflict/nk\\_1918\\_1920.shtml](http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/nk_1918_1920.shtml)
- NKR Rep. "Struggle for Freedom, 1923-1988," [http://www.nkrusa.org/nk\\_conflict/struggle\\_for\\_freedom.shtml](http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/struggle_for_freedom.shtml)
- Norwegian Refugee Council. "Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2004," Geneva, March 2005
- Papazian, Lalig. "A People's Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabagh." *The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh*. Ed. Levon Chorbajian. New York: Palgrave Publishers. 2001
- Personal interview with senior Armenian Foreign Ministry official, Yerevan, August 2005.
- Personal interview with former senior Karabakh Armenian negotiator to the USSR, Stepanakert, July 2005.
- Personal interview with senior Armenian Foreign Ministry official, Yerevan, August 2005.
- "Profile of Internal Displacement: Azerbaijan." Norwegian Refugee Council, February 2005
- "Profiles in Displacement: Azerbaijan. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng." United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 25 January 1999
- Tsalik, Svetlana. "Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?" *Caspian Revenue Watch*, 2003
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. "2004 Global Refugee Trends," <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocpdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=40d015fb4>
- "USACC Hosts Executive Director of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan." United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, 4 November 2005, <http://www.usacc.org/news.php?nid=632>
- US Association of International Development. "Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy, October 2004, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbd.pdf>.
- Ziyadov, Taleh and Alman, Mir-Ismael. "Arms Race in the South Caucasus: a Time Bomb?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*: Jamestown Foundation, 25 July 2005, [http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article\\_id=2370058](http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370058)